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Article on Political Economy of the Welfare State 
THEORIES OF THE WELFARE STATE: A CRITIQUE 
Ian Gough 
The article considers three major non-Marxist explanations of the modern welfare 
state: functionalist sociological theories, economic theories of government policy, 
and pluralist theories of democracy. Each is subjected to a critique and all are found 
wanting, in that none can satisfactorily explain the observable similarities and differ- 
ences in state welfare intervention within advanced capitalist countries. Functionalist 
theories can explain the dominant trends at work within all countries, but not the 
immense diversity in state policies which still persists. Economic and pluralist 
theories can explain the diversity but not the determinant trends. This failing is 
related to the separation of objective and subjective aspects in historical explanation: 
the fust school objectifies history, the second subjectifies it. The article concludes 
by asserting, but not arguing, that a Marxist approach offers a more fruitful way of 
understanding the welfare state, insofar as it rejects this separation. 
Let us accept, for the purposes of the argument here, Asa Briggs’ definition of the 
welfare state as “a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through politics 
and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least three 
directions” (1, p. 29). The directions he cites are the provision of a minimum income 
for all, the provision of income for specific “social contingencies” like sickness or old 
age, and the provision of a certain range of social services.’ This list is clearly incom- 
plete, omitting as it does a series of indirect means of “modifying the play of market 
forces” by way of state legislation rather than direct state provision of benefits in 
cash and kind. Nevertheless, broadly conceived, the welfare state is a recognizable 
feature of all advanced capitalist countries, at least since the Second World War. 
It is with various theoretical explanations of this phenomenon that this article is 
concerned. 
However, any acceptable theory of the welfare state-must not only explain its 
existence, but also two further observable features: 
1. The similar trends at work on state welfare intervention in all such countries; 
2. The immense diversify in the nature and scope of the welfare state which still 
persists. 
As an example of common trends, I would cite the ubiquitous tendency for state 
‘My use of the term “welfare state” should not be taken to imply that I accept its usual 
ideological connotations. It is used merely as a convenient shorthand term to designate the type Of 
State interventions listed by Briggs. 
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28 1 Cough 
expenditure on the social services as a share of GNP to rise over time. A report 
published by the Organisation for Economic Coaperation and Development in 1972 
commented: “the most striking feature is the extent to which education, health and 
social security were responsible for the rising share of government expenditure over 
this period” (1955-1969) in all such countries (2, p. 56; see also 3). A second 
tendency, rather more difficult to document, is for state policies between countries 
to  converge in important ways. Thus in the field of social security, those countries, 
chiefly in Europe, which early on initiated state social insurance schemes for specific 
occupational groups, are now modifying and extending them in similar ways: 
by moving toward universal coverage of the whole employed population, 
0 by reducing differences in treatment of various social and occupational groups, 
0 by establishing more unified administrative structures, 
by shifting to pay as you go financing, 
and last, but very important, 
0 by incorporating for the first time a national social minimum within the insur- 
ance scheme. 
Similar tendencies are also at work within the U.S. social insurance system. On 
the other hand, those countries, such as Britain and the Scandinavian countries, 
which early on established minimum income social assistance schemes and, in the 
decade following the Second World War, universal insurance schemes, have all since 
established earnings-related insurance schemes along continental lines? So there is 
a tendency toward convergence of policies in this field. Again, policies on health care 
exhibit markedly similar trends across countries with very different systems (4). 
So the first feature requiring explanation is the similarity of trends at work within 
the welfare state. 
The second feature, however (the other side of the same coin), is the immense 
structural diversity which persists between the welfare roles of states in different 
countries. The relative “backwardness” of the U.S. in welfare provision has often 
been commented on. Alone of the advanced capitalist countries (with the possible 
exception of Japan), it has no comprehensive health insurance system, nor any form 
of family allowance. Even within the European Economic Community the importance 
and value of child benefits, for example, varies enormously between France and 
Belgium, on the one hand, and West Germany, on the other (5). 
These, then, are the major empirical features of the contemporary welfare state 
which any theory must attempt to explain. To this end, I consider three major schools 
of non-Marxist thought. These might be labelled the sociological, the economic, and 
the political. They comprise: 
functionalist theories of the welfare state, 
economic theories of government policy, and 
pluralist theories of democracy. 
‘Much of this was suggested by reading R.  Lawson’s thoughtful paper, “Approaches to 
Pensions: Some European Comparisons” (unpublished manuscript). 
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Clearly, these approaches differ widely in scope and subject matter. My focus 
here is solely on the contribution each has made toward an understanding of the 
contemporary intervention of the state in the areas outlined above. Wider theoretical 
questions will be raised only insofar as they have a bearing on this. In each case the 
explanations will be criticized utilizing criteria internal to contemporary social science. 
TO anticipate, I shall argue that all three approaches are inadequate, in the sense that 
they cannot explain all the features of the contemporary welfare state enumerated 
above. Elsewhere I argue that a Marxist approach offers us a way out of this impasse. 
Before beginning the main argument, however, note that only those explanations of 
social policy which warrant the title “theories” are examined here. Much writing in 
this field is descriptive in nature, narrating the policy-landmarks of state welfare 
intervention. The history of the welfare state is conceived as a series of events or 
incidents essentially linked by the continuum of time. Insofar as an explanation of 
these changes or innovations in policy is provided, it is often in terms of the influence 
of a handful of “great men.” For C. V. Dicey, the author of Law and Opinion in 
England in the Nineteenth Century, published in 1905, the dominant role was played 
by great thinkers-philosophers, jurists, social theorists, etc., who shaped the opinion 
of those citizens active in public life. According to  Goldthorpe (6) ,  
In Dicey’s account of the nineteenth century revolution in government, of which 
the making of social policy is seen as a central feature, it is still individual thinkers 
who are the heroes and it is their philosophies and doctrines which appear as the 
ultimate agencies of social change. 
For others, the role played by “practical men”-civil servants, doctors, engineers, 
educationalists, social investigators, or whoever-is stressed: all far-sighted visionaries 
or humanitarian reformers concerned to neutralize so far as was possible the harmful 
effects of industrialization in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
We do not intend to waste time on these descriptive accounts of social policy 
development, though this approach has been prevalent, unfortunately, in much British 
and American writing. The link between descriptive or empiricist history and an 
emphasis on the role of great men has been revealed and criticized by Carr (7) and 
Stedman Jones (8), among others. As Stedman Jones recounts (8, pp. 98, 113), 
. . . SO much history was focused upon the constitution and upon “great men.” For non- 
sensible realities like class, mode of production or politically and culturally determined 
Patterns of behaviour were not empirically verifiable.. . . Those who tried to create 
out Of facts never understood that it was only theory that could constitute them 
as facts in the fxst place. Similarly, those who focused history upon the event failed to 
Iea& that events are only meaningful in terms of a structure which will establish them 
as such. 
the focus below is on the major theorerical traditions within non-Marxist thought. 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF THE WELFARE STATE 
There are two major schools within sociological writing on the welfare state. First, 
the ‘‘CO~SenSus’’ school, best represented in Britain by T. H. Marshall (9), charts a 
gradual development of citizenship and social rights in Britain and elsewhere. Second, 
the ‘yndustrial society” school, represented by Wilensky and Lebeaux (10) and the 
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later writings of Galbraith (1 l), stresses the imperatives of industrialization for social 
policy. I shall consider each in turn. 
The first school sees the welfare state as an enlightened response to the misery and 
degradation of life wrought by the industrial revolution in the 19th century. There 
are differences of approach here between those who emphasize rationality or morality 
in this process. The former would see social policies as the result of “rational” solu- 
tions to  certain preexisting social problems; the latter as “morally right” (by which 
is normally meant Christian) solutions to  those social problems (12). In either cap,  
this type of explanation of the rise of the welfare state resembles the more ad hoc 
explanations in terms of the ideas and actions of “great men .” But it differs in recog- 
nizing that the ideas these men hold do not appear ab initio. Instead, full recognition 
is accorded to the prior existence of a material “problem”: the social policy subse- 
quently initiated is then seen as the only rational or morally right response to that 
problem. 
It is apparent that this theoretical approach is founded on a consensual model of 
society. There is a profound agreement within society, or at least among substantial 
sections of it, not oniy on what constitutes a “social problem,” but also on the broad 
lines of policy to  deal with it. There is no room for a fundamental conflict between 
different groups over values and over state policies. Yet many social historians find 
it necessary to  incorporate conflict in order convincingly to explain certain events, 
as, for example, Gilbert (13) in his study of the origins of national insurance in Britain. 
Furthermore, the dynamic of society is seen as unilinear, as with Marshall’s view (9) 
of the spread of citizenship rights. Any regress in the rise of the welfare state would 
appear to  be out of the question, yet this is at least a possible development in the 
coming years. 
At first sight the second group of theories considered in this section appear very 
different. They stress the needs of “highenergy technology” (Wilensky and Lebeaux) 
or the “organic requirements” of the “industrial system” (Galbraith) when explaining 
the development of social policy. However, on closer inspection these too are based 
on a consensus model of society, while others have argued that both groups of theories 
are members of a broader tradition known as functionalism. I will elaborate the 
technological explanation of social policy before proceeding to a critique of both. 
According to Galbraith (1 l), modern technology possesses certain characteristics 
(such as the growing time-scale and inflexibility of production) which “compel” the 
adaptation of the economic structure (the rise of large corporations) and of the state 
(the growing range of functions and level of state expenditure). The result, if carried 
to its logical conclusion, is the pervasive ideology that all advanced industrial countries 
(capitalist and noncapitalist) are “converging” toward a common structure. This is 
sometimes termed “postindustrial society” and is regarded as most proximately 
realized in the contemporary U.S. Now, moving closer to our central concern here, 
Wilensky and Lebeaux apply this paradigm to explain the development of social 
welfare in industrial societies in the following way (10, p. 181): 
Technological changes of  industrialism lead to changes in the structure of society; 
these societal changes, in the context of American culture . . . produce or intensify 
concern about certain social problems, which creates a demand for welfare services. 
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k t  me illustrate this in terms of the family. Modern industrial society requires a high 
degree of personal mobility, for which the nuclear family is best suited: “the factory 
system creates a family system that best fits its needs” (10, p. 81). But in doing so, 
new social problems are generated: the elderly are left stranded, strains are imposed 
on youth, and married women experience conflicts between their two roles.3 This 
in turn generates a variety of social services to deal with their problems: old-age 
pensions, welfare services, probation work, etc. Conclusion: “much of social welfare 
service in America can be seen as a response to  the impact of industrialization on 
family life” (10, p. 67). In the appendix to  Wilensky and Lebeaux’s book this is 
explicitly backed by a Parsonian functionalist analysis setting out the four conditions 
which must be met to ensure “societal survival.” 
It is this determinist approach which provides the implicit framework for 
econometric studies of government expenditure. In these, items of government expen- 
diture are correlated with GNp per head and other variables, both for single countries 
over periods of time (time-series analysis) and for different countries at the same point 
in time (cross-section analysis) (14). One common conclusion is that welfare expendi- 
ture rises with income per head over time. “Economic growth and its demographic 
and bureaucratic outcomes are the root cause of the general emergence of the welfare 
state” (14, p. xiii). But all such studies face a problem in explaining the lack of correla- 
tion, within advanced capitalist countries, between welfare expenditure and income on 
a cross-section basis, one concrete example being the relatively low state expenditure 
on health services in some of the most affluent countries like the U.S. To cope with 
this problem, a variety of refinements are added; for example, the effect of “cultural 
factors” on social policy, or the role of different government structures, or the 
differing importance of working-class organizations between countries (14). All these 
add to the explanatory power of the theories, but unfortunately all are destructive of 
the original functionalist framework. For within this problematic, these amendments 
are inevitably contingent and od hoc. 
It is now time to consider more precisely the essence of such functionalist theories 
before proceeding to a critique. What is a “functional” explanation of social policy? 
According to Goldthorpe (6, PP. 50-51), it is one wherein 
the explanation of the growth of such provision is ultimately to begiven not in terms 
:f particular group interests and pressures; but rather, in terms of the objective 
demands” of certain social situations which are seen as virtually imposing particular 
courses of action. 
Or,in the words of Carrier and Kendall(l2, p. 21 l), it is one 
based on the assumption that action is determined by external and constraining social 
and non-social forces, and that a proper understanding of the latter can provide a 
c o m p h  explanation of the former? 
At the same time, industrialism creates the social problem of the aged, of youth, of the role 
Of women” (10, p. 81). It appears that the only nonproblematic group are middle-aged men! 
4MY emphasis. In my view, it is the second half of this definition which is signifcant. It is 
Permissible, indeed necessary, to  analyze the functions of the state. Functionalism, however, 
Proceeds to explain the policies pursued in terms of their functions, pure and simple, without 
3 I. 
the real historical factors which generate them. 
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so the existence of certain system imperatives (like the requirements of technology or 
industrial society) “produces” the requisite state policies. 
Clearly, the central problem with this approach concerns the meaning of a “func- 
tional imperative.” For Goldthorpe, one must always necessarily include the values of 
society, or at least those in power, in order to  understand which of a number of 
alternative “solutions” to a particular “problem” is adopted. 
When it is said by historians that a particular social problem “had to be dealt 
with” or that a particular piece of legislation was “imperative” or “inevitable,” 
what, apparently, is meant is that the alternative to action of the kind taken was 
such as to be clearly incompatible with the ends of those, at least, who were in a 
position to make the effective decision ( 6 ,  pp. 53-54). 
Now this criticism is correct so far as it goes, but that is not far enough, for 
Goldthorpe still tends toward a cognitive model of social problems, whereby these 
problems are readily apparent to  members of the society. According to Carrier and 
Kendall (12, p. 212), there is a further 
failure to examine the processes involved in the creation of “the social problems of 
society” by dikegarding the possibilities that there may not be consensus in society 
about whether a certain social phenomenon is a ‘‘social problem,” and that even 
where such consensus exists the exact “nature of the social problem” may be in 
dispute. 
AS they point out, in South Africa “a basic traditional social problem-death due to 
starvation-is denied official existence.” So the development of industrial society there 
has certainly not “called forth” the necessary policy responses, or rather has called 
forth a response completely outside the Western tradition of welfare, premised as it 
is on a different structural role for the Bantu family. 
From this basic misconception flow the other errors and inadequacies of functional- 
ist explanations. It too is premised on a consensual model of society, and the criticisms 
advanced against that school apply equally well here. Finally, both neglect the con- 
crete findings of historians and students of comparative social policies. Bismarck’s 
Prussia, Edwardian England, and the New Deal in the U.S., for example, represent 
quite different paths toward the “welfare state.” As Goldthorpe notes, a functional 
explanation is hard put to explain the diversity of social policies which we observe 
within the advanced capitalist countries. 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 
Health workers or anyone else interested in the welfare state might expect economic 
theory to  have something important to  say on a topic of such manifest importance 
today. On the whole they would be disappointed. If they did venture into this terrain 
they would experience a mild (or perhaps acute) schizophrenic feeling, so far divorced 
is much of the discussion from anything resembling the reality of the modern welfare 
state. In no area perhaps has the decline of political economy and the split between 
economics and sociology yielded such barren fruit. This is related to the “normative” 
stance of much economic writing on government policy. It is not intended to explain 
the growing role of the state or similar questions at all, but to provide criteria for 
evaluating government policy and to  lay down guidelines for the future. Even in 
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these terms, however, it cannot claim a great deal of success, partly due to the deep 
division which persists between neoclassical and microeconomic theory and Keynesian 
macroeconomic theory. 
Neoclassical economic theory of government policy is founded on the twin bases 
of liberal political theory and welfare economics. Recently these two pillars have 
tended to shift outwards from each other, resulting in some frightening cracks in the 
edifice, but for a long time they appeared harmonious (see Macpherson, reference 15, 
for an interesting perspective on the relation between the two). Since the 17th 
century, liberal theory has propounded the doctrine of individual rights and limited 
government in the interests of political and economic freedom. Modern proponents, 
such as Milton Friedman (16), the monetarist economist, have spelled out the 
functions a government must necessarily perform to fulfil these conditions. It must: 
0 act as rule maker and umpire, 
0 define and enforce private property rights, 
0 provide a stable monetary framework, 
0 prevent, so far as possible, the formation of monopolies (though Friedman is 
unsure whether a public monopoly is better than a private monopoly), 
0 provide necessary “public goods,” that is, those goods and services, such as 
defense or the proverbial lighthouse, which cannot be consumed individually 
but necessarily “benefit” all members of that society, and 
compensate for the effect of glaring “externalities” in production and consump- 
tion, that is, where the action of one party harms or benefits another party. 
The last two functions on this list are most relevant to welfare policy, and they, 
together with the fourth function, draw for their legitimation on welfare economics. 
Welfare economics has developed since Pareto and Pigou to provide criteria for 
evaluating the “welfare” effect of various policies. It argues that the unrestrained 
operation of the capitalist market will maximize “welfare” except in certain circum- 
stances. The state should thus refrain from disturbing this allocation of resources 
unless to  counter those forces which will prevent the attainment of this “ideal out- 
put.” The major problems here are the existence of increasing returns to  scale and 
monopolies, public goods, and “spillover effects.” In fact,. all can be classified as 
subsets of the concept of externalities, and it is this concept which poses the most 
intractable problems for orthodox economic theory.’ As mentioned above, externali- 
ties occur when the production or consumption of goods imposes costs (or provides 
benefits) to persons other than those doing the producing or consuming. A favorite 
example is pollution, when the factory chimney or the private car pollutes the 
atmosphere of local residents. If a voluntary solution is not practical, then there is a 
case for some form of government intervention in order to (attempt to) maximize 
total social welfare. The point is that the number of such effects on other parties is 
’Of course, there is a major problem in building a bridge between these rubrics for “ideal” 
government policies and what governments actually do. Normative statements will Only translate 
themselves into positive ones if governments act and only act on the insights of normative 
economics. I do not deal with this problem, but have been helped here and elsewhere in this 
section by Petter Nore’s useful paallel paper, “The State in Orthodox Economics” (an unpub- 
lished manuscript), where a more detailed critique of these theories is presented. 
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literally infinite, ranging from the long-term ecological results of economic activity 
to the external benefits and disbenefits to children resulting from the attributes of 
their parents. is evident that numerous social and other policies can hence be 
justified in terms of welfare economics. 
This has resulted in a clear split between two groups who may be labelled “liberals” 
and “pXetians,” The “liberals” lay stress on individual freedom and minimal state 
intervention and attempt to define strictly limited conditions which permit govern- 
ment interference with the private market. The “Paretians” accept that welfare 
analysis cannot 0 priori rule out state intervention in numerous fields today. As 
O’Connor puts it (17, p. 373): “It is often possible to ‘justify’ any particular govern- 
ment interference after the fact-justify it in terms of orthodox criteria.” The result 
has been a widening gulf between the political and economic elements that have 
contributed to modern welfare economics. 
One effect of this has been a new development: a positive economic theory of the 
democratic process and of the resulting role and function of governments. These are 
the “economic theories of democracy” associated with Downs, Olson, Buchanan, 
Tullock, and others.6 It is not our intention to discuss this burgeoning area in detail 
here. Suffice it to note that all have in common an axiomatic approach: they postulate 
the existence of individual actors attempting to maximize their satisfactions in situa- 
tions where not all their ends can be met. In this way neoclassical economics forms 
the core of a wider “science of choice,” and this can be applied to an analysis of voting 
behavior, and of politicians’ behavior. On this basis predictions can be made about 
likely government policies, for example, the degree of income redistribution they will 
attempt, which can be tested against the evidence. 
All such theories utilize an individualist methodology which is profoundly unsocio- 
logical. They posit an atomized society consisting solely of individuals: there is no 
conception of class or class interest. Second, they see state expenditures and other 
policies as ultimately determined solely by voters’ preferences registered in the ballot 
box and the preferences of politicians. In a word, the “state” is identical to the 
“legislature.” Lastly, the theory of choice is premised on an absence of conflict 
and coercion. “The notion of agreement, or of consensus, is at the heart of modern 
normative economics” (19, p. 5) and the phenomena of coercion and conflict cannot 
be coped with in this framework. Neither, we might add, can the phenomena of 
ideoiogy and hegemony, since each individual is assumed to be autonomous, with his 
tastes and preference patterns ordained at birth, or at least unaffected by the society 
in which he lives. We share the criticism put forward by Peacock and Wiseman (20, 
p. 14): 
No government is concerned, as these theories imply, solely with interpreting the 
choices of individual members of the community. AU governments depend for their 
existence upon their power to coerce as well as upon the consent of the governed. 
Recent attempts within this school to  incorporate a more realistic approach to the 
state have led to insoluble contradictions with the underlying individualist method- 
6Downs’ theory is analyzed at length by Barry (18). The implications for government policies 
on redistribution are succinctly if uncritically summarized by Culyer (19). 
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ology. (See the revealing introduction by Culyer to a recent collection of work 
papers (21).) 
When we turn from micro- to macroeconomic theory, we move from an ideology 
justifying capitalism to a set of techniques useful in maintaining and manipulating 
capitalism. Keynesian economics in the 1930s did not bring about such a funda- 
mental theoretical revolution as did the rise of neoclassical theory in the 1870s, in 
that it did not provide an alternative theory of value. Nonetheless, of course, its real 
economic and political effect has been profound. Since the war most governments in 
advanced capitalist countries have adopted a macroeconomic strategy, designed to  
pursue certain goals of policy. The list of goals usually includes full employment, 
price stability, a reasonable rate of economic growth, and balance of payments 
equilibrium. However, this by itself fails to provide an adequate account of the rise 
of the welfare state. First, the modern stabilization functions of government do not 
require a continual increase in state expenditure over time, merely its cyclical adjust- 
ment up and down. Second, a demand-stimulating policy can work as well via 
armaments or highways as via welfare expenditure, so that the secular growth of the 
latter remains unexplained. 
Macroeconomists tackling this problem normally either have assumed that govern- 
ment spending is “exogenous”-it is determined “outside the system”-or have under- 
taken econometric analysis to discover what has actually happened. The only attempt 
that goes beyond this which might be included under this category is that by Peacock 
and Wiseman (20). They explain the growth of government expenditure in the U.K. as 
a result of specific “social disturbances,” such as the two World Wars, which “dis- 
place” upwards the level of government expenditure. First, these disturbances upset 
and uprate what the population will accept as a “normal” level of taxation, and 
second, they impose new obligations on governments, both by bringing about a 
different “political climate” and by leading to the discovery of new social needs or 
the rediscovery of old ones. 
This theory has the advantages of being firmly anchored in history, and of having a 
great deal of empirical support. Titmuss (22) and others have demonstrated the effect 
which the Second World War had in Britain on the perception of social needs, for 
example, the way in which the evacuation of British cities opened up middle-class 
eyes to urban conditions, and on policy responses to these perceived needs. However, 
it is unsatisfactory as a general theory of state welfare intervention for several reasons, 
of which two may be mentioned here. 
First, there is a problem of what constitutes a “social disturbance” (a problem 
returned to below) and of why similar “disturbances” have resulted in. quite different 
Policy responses. Why, for example, did the interwar slump lead to  the New Deal in 
the United States, but to cutbacks and retrenchment in the U.K.? Second, their 
‘‘displacement theory” cannot explain the continuing and rapid growth of social (and 
Other) expenditure during the “long boom” following the Second World War. This 
was in many advanced capitalist countries a period of social peace and political 
which, according to their theory, should have seen a levelling off of public 
at the postwar plateau, not a continuing climb. For these reasons, while 
the novel insights of their approach, we must reject it as a general theory 
Of state welfare expenditure, even for the U.K. 
PLURALIST THEORIES OF POLICY MAKING 
Pluralist theories of the democratic process represent the distinctive contribution 
of political science to studies of contemporary social policy. The basic premise of this 
approach is that power is widely diffused in “Western democracies.” Consequently, 
conflict between different groups, which is an equally important characteristic of these 
countries, is effectively managed without any group exerting a dominant influence in 
the political system. In an obvious link with liberal theory, the state is seen as a neutral 
arena within which interest groups can compete on an equal footing. Pluralist theories 
differ from the economic theories of democracy considered above by recognizing that 
individuals form coalitions or interest groups representing their common concerns, and 
that these groups attempt to  influence government policy in a variety of ways. 
A necessary condition for a pluralist democracy is, of course, that no one interest 
group becomes dominant, even by default. One attempt to  justify this was made some 
years ago by J.  K .  Galbraith with his concept of “countervailing power” (23, p. 127): 
The tendency of power to be organised in response to  a given position of power 
is the vital characteristic of the phenomenon I am here identifying. As noted, power 
on one side of a market creates both the need for, and the prospect of reward to, the 
exercise of countervailing power from the other side. This means that, as a common 
rule, we can rely on countervailing power to appear as a curb on economic power. 
It is readily apparent that this provides a formidable buttress for pluralist theories of 
the governmental process. 
The pluralist model has often been applied to explain the origins and development 
of specific social policies. The founding of the British National Health Service, and the 
particular features it exhibits, have been accounted for in terms of conflict between 
interested pressure groups, such as the British Medical Association, local authorities, 
the insurance lobby, voluntary hospitals, and the civil service (see Eckstein, 24). 
A recent series of studies has applied this method to a range of social policy innova- 
tions, developments, and reforms (25). However, none of these applications of 
pluralist political science have, to my knowledge, moved beyond the case-study 
approach, and it is difficult to  see how they could? Each individual act of policy 
is theorized as a unique event determined by the particular constellation of interest 
groups concerned. Hence this cannot provide a general theory to explain the growth 
or structure of the welfare state in a particular country. 
Second, though conflict is an intrinsic attribute of the pluralist model, it is not a 
structured conflict between groups with particular interests related to the overall 
socioeconomic structure, i.e. social classes. In their place we have a series of shifting 
coalitions. Thus, as Wedderburn (26) observes: 
Professor Titmuss has produced a revealing model of the way in which the 
conflict of different interest groups can shape and mould the final form of legislation 
which emerges. What is missing, however, is any notion of class conflict as crucial in 
creating the overall balance of political forces which determines whether or not social 
legislation is enacted, or as an influence upon the final form of that legislation. 
7An exception is perhaps provided by the literature on industrial relations, where unions and 
employers are seen as two permanently opposed “pressure groups’’ with the state acting as umpire 
and mediator. 
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Or, in other words, pluralism looks at “the skirmishes between pressure groups, rather 
than the battles between social classes” (27, p. 245). 
Third, and most crucial, pluralist theory pays no attention to  the generation of 
opinions and values within society. In this it has a lot in common with welfare 
economic theory, as is revealingly admitted by Dahl: “liberal democratic theory has 
often started with the assumption that the preferences of individuals, whether voters 
or consumers, should be taken as given, autonomous to the individual, rather than 
socially determined” (quoted in 25, p. 144). But it is perfectly possible for an overtly 
pluralist political process to coexist in a society where one group above others 
exercises decisive power, if the values of that group are internalized by the members 
of that society. This is, of course, the phenomenon of ideological hegemony first 
advanced by Cramsci, and argued in relation to  modem state policy by Miliband (28), 
who provides a general critique of pluralism. Apropos of social policies, George and 
Wilding (27, p .  244) convincingly argue that 
the values of dominant social groups have been a major influence in the development 
of social policy. What we loosely and uncritically call “social values” are, in fact, 
upper and middle class values legitimated by the institutional order and internalised 
by the whole population. 
In consequence, the pluralism of the political process is a surface appearance, masking 
a deeper agreement on values which “legitimate, support and perpetuate the existing 
social and economic system.” We must conclude, therefore, that not only do pluralist 
theories of policy making not provide a general theory of the development or structure 
of the welfare state, but that even if one were developed it would suffer from a fatal 
neglect of crucial aspects of the structure of capitalist society. 
CONCLUSION 
For the purposes of summarizing the arguments above, we can group the theories 
into two types: functionalist and action theories. 
Functionalist theories of the welfare state objectify all processes within society 
and see policy developments as a passive response to these social or nonsocial “forces.” 
There is no room here for humans as active, initiating groups helping to shape their 
own history8 Functionalism does have the advantage that it focuses on the objective 
social determinants of human history-on laws of development which operate inde- 
pendent of peoples’ consciousness and intentions. It also conceives of history as a 
process and at the same time as progress, whether toward greater rationality, good- 
ness, or control over the inanimate world. In this, of course, it bears a resemblance to  
historical materialism and Marxist historiography (and to that of non-Marxists such 
as E. H. Carr). 
“History has a direction,” writes Hobsbawm (31, p. 279), “it is the growing emanci- 
pation of man from nature and his growing capacity to control it, which makes history 
as a whole (though not every area and period within it) ‘oriented and irreversible’.’’ 
But, for Marx, the development of the forces of production under capitalism (which 
‘It should be apparent that in this article no pretense is made at a systematic critique of 
functionalist sociology, for which the reader should consult Gouldner (29) and Rex (30). 
he stressed and indeed praised) was precisely one side only of a contradiction with the 
social relations of production under capitalism (which he just as consistently con- 
demned). To concentrate only on the first moment, as functionalism does especially 
in the hands of “technological determinists,” is to ignore the fact that history is also a 
succession of qualitatively distinct modes of production, and hence ignores the role of 
classes, class conflict, and revolutionary rupture in human history. Applied to the 
explanation of the welfare state, functionalist theory recognizes its role in producing 
the type of individual required by “modern industrial society,” but it cannot perceive 
this type as specific to  capitalist society, and hence ignores the welfare state’s role as 
a controlling, repressive agency. 
We have already noted the common ancestor of welfare economics and pluralism: 
that of liberal political theory. This is one reason for treating them together here, but 
there are two related reasons. First, they both utilize an individualist methodology, 
which, unlike functionalism, views individuals as the basic units of society, and which 
studies their behavior in certain situations. It is true that pluralist political theory 
conducts its analysis in terms of groups of individuals, but the work of Olson and 
others (see 18, Ch. 2) has attempted to forge a link here by deriving the conditions 
under which individuals with common interests will form pressure groups to bargain 
for those interests in the democratic political arena. 
The second reason for treating welfare economics and pluralism together is that 
both schools are “actionaiented” and embrace the general principles of action- 
theory. That is, analysis is in terms of human subjects-their interpretation of reality 
in light of their values, and their responses to it. Thus, explanations of social policy 
focus on the subjective interpretation of what constitutes a social problem, rather 
than on the objective determination of the problem as with functionalist theory. 
It has the merit of stressing the subjective content of human action, the creative role 
of mankind in history. It can also accommodate conflict as a determinant of policy, 
albeit in a limited form divorced from the structural position of classes in society. 
In these respects it has something in common with Marxism, but without any concep- 
tion of structural determination. There is no recognition of a material reality outside 
the heads of the “actors” which shapes their values and behavior, except in the 
emasculated form of a generalized “scarcity.” 
Thus, the one school of social science objectifies history, the other subjectities it. 
Returning to our original goal-a theory of the development of social policies and of 
the phenomenon of the welfare state-functionalism can explain the first of our 
observations: the historic growth of social expenditure, and the trend for social 
policies in advanced capitalist countries gradually to converge. But it cannot satis- 
factorily explain the immense diversity of social policies which any comparative 
survey will reveal. Per contra, theories of the second school (economic and pluralist 
theories) can explain this diversity but offer no reason as to why the growth of welfare 
expenditure and convergence of welfare policies has taken place. By ignoring respec- 
tively the subjective and objective element, both are inadequate to explain this or any 
other aspect of history, in which both are related. I believe that the only satisfactory 
resolution to this dilemma is that indicated by Marx and encapsulated in his dictum: 
“Men make their own history . . .bu t  not under circumstances chosen by themselves.” 
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Of course, this does no more than suggest a fruitful approach to the problem. It is 
up to Marxist research to justify this claim, and in a forthcoming book I will attempt 
to do so. However, the more limited purpose of this article is to argue that existing 
theories of the welfare state are inadequate, and that this is so because they ignore 
either one or the other moment of Marx’s famous duality. 
Acknowledgment-I am grateful to Norman Ginsburg for constructive comments on 
an earlier draft. 
REFERENCES 
1. Briggs, A. The welfare state in historical perspective. Reprinted in The Welfare State, edited 
by C. Schottland. Harper and Row, New York, 1977. 
2. Expenditure Trends in OECD Countries 1960-1 980. Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Paris, 1972. 
3. Gough, I. State expenditure in advanced capitalism. New Left Review No. 92: 56-64, 1975. 
4. Chester, T. E. Health care: Problems and priorities. Executive. Graduate School of Business 
and Public Administration, Cornell University, Fall 1976. 
5. KaimCaudle, P. Comparative Social Policy and Social Security. Martin Robertson, London, 
1973. 
6. Goldthorpe, J .  H. The development of social policy in England, 1800-1914. In Transacfions 
of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, p. 45. International Sociological Association, 
Louvain, 1964. 
7. Carr, E. H. What Is History? Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1964. 
8. Stedman Jones, G. History: The poverty of empiricism. In Ideology in SocialScience, edited 
by R. Blackburn. Fontana, London, 1972. 
9. Marshall, T. H. Citizenship and social class. In Sociology at the Crossroads. Heinemann, 
London, 1963. 
10. Wilensky, H. L., and Lebeaux, C. N. Industrial Society and Social Welfare. Glencoe Free 
Press, New York, 1965. 
11. Galbraith, J .  K. The New Industrial State, Introduction and Ch. 1. Penguin, Harmondsworth, 
1969. 
12. Carrier, J., and Kendall, I. Social policy and social change. Journal of  Social Policy, Vol. 2, 
part 3,1973. 
13. Gilbert, B. B. The Evolution ofNationalInsurance in Great Britain. Michael Joseph, London, 
1966. 
14. Wilensky, H. L. The Welfare State and Equality. University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1975. 
15. Macpherson, C. B. Politics: Post-liberal democracy. Reprinted in Ideology and Social Science, 
edited by R. Blackburn. Fontana, London, 1972. 
16. Friedman, M. Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962. 
17. O’Connor, J. Scientific and ideological elements in the economic theory of government 
policy. Reprinted in A Critique of Economic Theory. edited by E. Hunt and J. Schwartz. 
Penquin, Harmondsworth, 1972. 
18. Barry, B. M. Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy. Collier-Macmillan, London, 1970. 
19. Culyer, A. J. The Economics of SocLl Policy, Ch. 4. Martin Robertson, London, 1973. 
20. Peacock, A. T., and Wiseman, J. The Growth of Public Expenditures in the U.K., Ed. 2. 
Allen and Unwin, London, 1967. 
21. Culyer, A. J., editor. Economic Policies and Social Goals. Martin Robertson, London, 1974. 
22. Titmuss, R. M. Problems of Sochl Policy (A Volume of the Official History of the Second 
World War). Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1950. 
23. Galbraith, J. K. American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power. Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1963. 
24. Eckstein, H. The English Health Service: Its Origins, Structure and Achievements. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1959. 
40 I cough 
25. Hall, p., Land, H,, parker, R., and Webb, A. C h a w .  Choice and Conflict m Social Policy. 
Adm:nhtratbn, Vol. 6 ,NO.  3,1972. 
28. Miliiand, R. The State in Capitalist society. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1969. 
29. Gouldner, A. The Coming Crisis in Western sociology. Heinemann, London, 1970. 
30. Rex, I .  Key Problems of Sociological Theory. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961. 
31. Hobsbawm, E. J. Karl Marx’s contribution to  historiography. In Ideology and Social Science, 
edited by R. Blackburn. Fontana, London, 1972. 
Manuscript submitted for publication, May 31,1977 
Direct reprint requests to: 
Mr. Ian Cough 
Department of Social Administration 
University of Manchester- 
Manchester MI 3 9PL, England 
